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Abstract
This article aims to examine whether there is continuity between eugenics as employed in Nazi 
Germany and modern-day medical genetics. Drawing on Foucault’s conceptualization of the 
relationship between power and knowledge, it draws the conclusion that despite the differences 
in the means employed and underlying motivations, both may serve as disciplinary tools and 
shape human behaviour. Finally, it addresses ethical issues that arise during genetic reproduction 
counselling. Namely, it reviews how genetic information during genetic reproduction counselling is 
presented to those being counselled and puts forward the idea on how to stay committed to the 
principle of non-directiveness.
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Introduction
Today, the increased knowledge about genetics and reproductive 
technology has opened the door for manipulating an individual’s genetic 
makeup (genotype) with the aim of repairing faulty genes. Genetic 
technologies undoubtedly have a great promise to treat, but may also 
serve as a tool for “normalizing”1 and controlling individuals.
This paper will seek to examine whether there is a continuity between 
the eugenics ideology and what we today call genetics, or using Fraser’s 
words: “whether there is continuity of parts of Nazi medical and legal 
ideology within today’s institutional discourses and practices” (Fraser, 
2005, 419). Its aim is to review how genetic information is dealt with today, 
especially during the genetic reproduction counselling. It will not suggest 
that increased knowledge about genetics and the way such knowledge 
is employed today will lead to another Holocaust. However, I believe there 
are certain similarities in ideologies which surrounded Nazi eugenics and 
the genetics ideologies that exist today, even though those ideologies 
are implemented through different strategies. The paper will argue that 
today, although there are no laws prohibiting procreation of people with 
genetic disorders, the genetic knowledge itself shapes the agency of 
designated persons. Thus, it could be argued that medical knowledge 
became part of a social policy. If genetic knowledge has a capacity to 
govern a subject’s agency, an important question arises: namely, what 
are the moral issues that we should be worried about with respect to this 
governing power knowledge? Despite there being concerns with regard 
to the use of genetic test results in the employment and insurance contexts, 
the purpose of this essay is to flash out the issues arising from informal 
ways of regulating acts of counselees during the genetic reproduction 
counselling. 
The paper has been organised in the following way. The first part gives 
an overview of the eugenic practices and laws during the Nazi era. 
1 Throughout this paper the term normalization will refer to processes and means of compelling people to conform 
to social norms. For more general remarks on the topic of what is considered normal in our society and how social 
norms induce people to conform with them see L. Fiedler (1984) ‘The Tyranny of the Normal’, The Hastings Centre 
Report, vol. 14, no.2, 40-42.
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The second part will examine new modes of governance arising from 
contemporary medical knowledge and their ability to regulate the acts of 
designated individuals. This analysis will draw on Foucault’s insights about 
the power and knowledge. The third part will deal with reproduction 
counselling ethics and policy as a core genetic worry, and it will seek to 
address the ethical dilemmas arising from the use of genetic information 
in reproduction counselling.
Historical Perspective - Eugenics During the Nazi Era
The idea of eugenics was created in the United States, long before Hitler 
came to power in Germany. Francis Galton coined the term eugenics in 
the mid-19th century and claimed that breeding between only talented 
persons would result in better offspring (Black, 2003). Black describes 
eugenics as a racist pseudoscience, determined to wipe away all human 
beings deemed “unfit” (ibid), while it can be argued, one of Hitler’s 
goals was to create a uniform, homogenous society. Hitler’s vision of 
homogenous society meant that only those genetically and physically 
healthy citizens are deemed to be a part of society. Conversely, this 
meant that he targeted not only minorities, but the whole of society. It was 
held that the future of German people depended on the preservation 
of German blood. This preservation was done on two levels – through 
“positive” eugenic measures encouraging the breeding of “pure” Aryans 
and “negative” eugenics measures aimed at removing elements of 
society that were either considered to be “alien” or genetically disabled. 
Since the aim of this essay is to assess how modern genetic technologies 
are applied today, and to depict potential dangers that genetic screening 
generates, this chapter will focus on outlining the laws and practices 
during the Nazi era that had been designed to discourage those who did 
not have good blood from having children, namely the negative eugenic 
policies which discriminated against the individuals deemed hereditarily 
ill. This inquiry is the basis in trying to reach a conclusion whether it is 
possible to identify the continuity between parts of Nazi medical and 
legal ideology and the way society today deals with genetic information. 
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During the Nazi era, law2 was generally used as a central mechanism for 
the construction of a uniform society and achieving social goals. Thus, in 
1933 the “Law for the Prevention of Hereditary Diseases” was enacted 
introducing mandatory sterilization in cases of genetic disorders. Fraser 
argues that the very core ideas of the Nazi state, the protection of the 
German Volksgemeinschaft and the elimination of its racial enemies, 
could only be achieved in and through law (Fraser, 2005, 29). According 
to Fraser, “Volksgemeinschaft is the community based on blood and 
written in the body of law, and the law delimits the subject not just in 
terms of merit and obligation, but also in the foundation of the blood 
and the body” (Fraser, 2005, 16). The law created a strong distinction 
between “us” and “them”, meaning that “them” were “those deemed to 
be “hereditary ill”, ”alien” or “asocial”” (Bureligh and Wippermann, 1991, 
305-306) . Thus it could be argued that Hitler was trying to legitimize anti-
Semitism by medicalizing it. Fraser notes that the whole Nazi worldview 
was a eugenic one, informed by what was for them a scientific ideal of 
racial purity (Fraser, 2005, 31). An individual whose ability to procreate 
was deemed to pose a threat to the well-being of society was singled 
out (Fraser, 2005, 118). Furthermore, a special two-tier hereditary court 
system was established. In the first instance, the Hereditary Health Court 
was operating and consisted of a judge and two physicians. In the case 
of the appeal, the Hereditary Health Court of Appeals would reach the 
final decision about the application for sterilization. The sterilization could 
be undertaken even against a person’s will if the Court decided that it 
had to be done. 
In addition to the regulation of peoples’ behaviour through law as a 
coercive mechanism, “law under National Socialism operated also as a 
kind of “taxonomical practice” that helps organize society into races that 
seem natural and biologically real” (Szobar, 2002). Law was thus not only 
used for regulating behaviour through punishment, but was also deployed 
for enforcing social hierarchies. Therefore, theorists like Ian Haney Lopez 
2 I find it important to note that even though the inquiry into whether Nazi law was law in the first place is of a vital 
importance and at the heart of the debates about the Holocaust, such an inquiry is beyond the scope of this 
paper and I shall not deal with it. For the purposes of this paper, I will accept the argument of David Fraser that 
Nazism was perpetrated through and under law and that, as Fraser notes: ‘Auschwitz was not a lawless time or 
place. Auschwitz was lawful, it was full of law - lawful  prescriptions of „Aryan“ and „Jew“, lawful sterilizations 
and euthanasia to protect the blood, lawful orders, from lawyers to doctors, for the removal, isolation, and then 
extermination of those enemies of the State, those parasites who would infect the Volksgemeinschaft.’ He also 
specifically refers to compulsory eugenic sterilization, claiming that it was in fact ‘lawful’.  (See D. Fraser (2005), 
‘Law after Auschwitz: Towards the Jurisprudence of the Holocaust’).
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emphasize that law during National Socialism also had a role of disciplining 
people in the field of gender and sexuality, functioning as a system of rules 
as well as a system of knowledge (Szobar, 2002).
It appears that in the sphere of reproduction, which presents the most 
intimate aspect of one’s life, the power of decision-making was taken 
away from an individual and put into the hands of the state, which 
resulted in a blurred line between public and private lives. In such a way 
breeding became a privilege to benefit the Volk, and ceased to be 
the right to be exercised by all adults. It was not an individual who was 
important but the community. Ingo Müller, in his book “Hitler’s Justice” 
mentions the case of an architect with suicidal tendencies, who was 
subject to sterilization despite being a father of healthy children and other 
obvious evidence pointing that the cause for his state was not hereditary 
(Műller, 1991, 124). In this case, Müller pinpoints to the ease with which 
a decision to sterilize someone was made. I refer to this case because it 
also reveals how insignificant the benefit of the individual in Nazi Germany 
was. Namely, in this case, the Hereditary Health Court of Appeals found 
that having suicidal tendencies was enough to conclude that sterilization 
was necessary because the purpose of the law was not to protect the 
individual, but the German people (Műller, 1991). It is precisely this notion 
of an overriding community importance and its “advancement” wherein 
a link between Nazi eugenic policies and laws and contemporary genetic 
interventions subsist. 
Knowledge as a New Disciplinary Tool
My claim is that there are points of parallels between eugenic ideology 
and today’s medical genetic ideologies and that certain aspects of 
medical care and practices can sometimes be accused to be potentially 
eugenic (Ledley, 1994). This continuity is apparent in the way medical 
genetics strives to “normalize” an individual body. Despite there being no 
laws today that expressly proscribe who should breed and who should 
not, I believe that genetic knowledge and genetic technologies, such as 
genetic reproduction counselling have the ability to shape our behaviour 
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in accordance with what is perceived to be normal given the prevailing 
social standards. Before examining the ethical concerns arising from these 
attempts to “normalize” individuals, with which I will deal in the next chapter 
of this paper, I wish to outline an important distinction between eugenics 
and medical genetics. Notwithstanding that “medical genetics, unlike 
eugenics, does not presuppose the existence of any form of institutionalized 
social control” (Ledley, 1994), such as laws that govern our bodies, the 
increased availability of the genetic information and advancements in 
genetic technologies manage to shape our actions and have an effect on 
the ways in which we make decisions about our bodies and ourselves. The 
question then is, if not through law, how does medical knowledge manage 
to regulate human behaviour? Michel Foucault’s analysis of governance 
and knowledge informs an answer to this question.
Foucault distinguishes several regimes of power, i.e. normative power 
(power over life), which is located in unofficial institutions, and juridical 
power (threat of death coming from the sovereign) (Foucault, 1981). 
Juridical power functions through prohibitions and punishments, coercion 
and constraints, and it prevents the individual from doing something. This 
power “operates mainly as a means of deduction” (Foucault, 1981, 136), 
meaning it punishes by taking away something. In contrast to juridical 
power, normative power is about social norms, not laws, and it strives to 
stabilize and normalize society through subjects’ active engagement. For 
the present purposes, this normative power, and its two aspects, biopower 
and disciplinary power are of great importance. Normative power is an 
informal power which consists of unwritten rules, social norms as well as 
of fear of pressure, and is enforced but not by anyone particular. The 
first aspect of normative power – biopower -  targets the population as a 
whole, and it is the way in which capitalist states exercise power over all 
aspects of peoples’ lives; “biopower analyses, regulates, controls, explains 
and defines the human subject, its body and behaviour” (Danaher, 
Schirato and Webb, 2000). Biopower classifies normality and abnormality 
(Koch and Svendsen, 2005) by collecting data, evaluating successes 
and failures. Foucault claims that today we witness a shift from sovereign 
power to normative power, a shift from law to the norm as an instrument 
of social control. The second aspect of normative power - disciplinary 
power – targets the individual body and was, according to Foucault, 
at first apparent only in institutions such as prisons, but later it became a 
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technique of social regulation and control. The author of this normative 
power is a capitalist society which strives to administrate life3. The primary 
interest of power ceased to be a defence of the sovereign and came to 
be the improvement and managing of life. Foucault does not state that 
there is no juridical power anymore, but it is not the only or primary way in 
which the power works. It is important to note that Foucault believed that 
the individual could resist this power. However, the limits of his theoretical 
framework come from the fact that he never elaborated on mechanisms 
that individuals had on their disposal in resisting this power4. 
In line with Foucault’s thoughts, it could be said that it is precisely this 
normative power that opens the possibility for new ways of regulating 
peoples’ behaviour according to available genetic information. In 
contrast to Nazi eugenic measures that were expressly embodied in the 
legal prohibitions, which then also led to self-policing of the individuals, 
today, more horizontal modes of power are employed for achieving 
social goals. While the top-down mode of governance was a concept 
applied for pursuing eugenic policies during the Nazi era, contemporary 
policing of human behaviour in relation to their genetic makeup is done 
in the name of human health, through self-regulation and self-censorship. 
Koch points out that despite there being no legal coercion, coercion is still 
present and exercised through informal means (Koch, 2004). Individuals 
are induced to behave in accordance with standards set by society. They 
self-regulate and become agents of their own normalization. 
It is interesting to note that there is also a point of overlap between how 
internal conformity was achieved in Nazi Germany and today. Szobar notes 
that “even in Nazi Germany, the law had a constitutive function as well as 
a coercive one in that it enabled the formation of racial identity and the 
enforcement of racial policy” (Szobar, 2002). She notes that the informal 
pressures, such as community disapproval of relationships between Jews 
and Germans as well as social and economic discrimination encouraged 
3 Foucault sees normative power as “an indispensable element in the development of capitalism and the one that is 
constantly exercised by means of surveillance rather than in a discontinuous manner by means of system of levies 
and obligations distributed over time”. See M. Foucault, ‘The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, Volume 
One, Harmonsdworf: Penguin 1981, 140.
4 For example, notwithstanding the significant overlap between Foucault’s and feminist thoughts on power, some 
feminist theorists such as Nancy Fraser argue that by reducing individuals to docile bodies and the effects of power, 
Foucault fails to acknowledge who resists the power. See Nancy Fraser, ‘Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and 
Gender in Contemporary Social Theory’, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 1989.
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mixed couples to end their relationship (Szobar, 2002). In the sphere of 
sexual and family relations it had an effect of shaping and governing 
peoples’ behaviour in the way that was in conformity with the norms of 
National Socialism. In my view, genetic knowledge performs such a role. 
This suggests that in National Socialism, law was used to encourage 
individuals to self-discipline themselves, and today, the increased 
knowledge about our genetic makeup is doing the same task. Those 
social norms capable of regulating behaviour are not written down, but 
everybody knows them and shapes his or her behaviour according to 
them.
How then, if not through the law, do social norms manage to adjust 
subjects’ behaviour according to the available genetic knowledge? I 
believe that the knowledge about the genetic code is enabling society to 
socialise people by using ‘genetic risk’ as a new mode of governing and 
disciplining lives (Rouvroy, 2008). I wish to unpack what this notion of the 
“genetic risk” means because it is important in ascertaining how a subject’s 
behaviour is shaped according to the predictions about such risks, and 
to explain my claim about continuity. Understanding the genetic risk is 
also central for assessing ethical questions arising in genetic reproduction 
counselling which I will be discussing in the following chapter. In general 
terms, risk is an expression of probability, and in the effort to regulate the 
anticipated risks, we make risk assessments and modulate our behaviour 
according to those assessments. Risks can be regulated in different ways, 
from commands to encouragement to self-regulation. In the sphere of 
“genetic risks”, many authors, such as Rouvroy argue that risk governance 
responsibility is ascribed to individuals (Rouvroy, 2008). Rouvroy explains 
that “genetic risk” functions as a ”‘technology of the self”, encouraging 
people to get the most information they can about their genetic status, 
which then enables them to act “responsibly” towards their health and 
genetic health of their blood relatives (Rouvroy, 2008). Genetic tests make 
it possible to gather extensive information about the genetic profile of the 
individual, and, it is claimed that according to the information gathered, 
genetic risk can be calculated and genetic diagnosis established. Lemke 
argues that genetic diagnosis can offer possible interventions to minimize 
or avoid risk (Lemke, 2005, 97). I would disagree with Lemke in this latter 
part. Namely, I do not think risk can be completely avoided. Or to put 
it this way: avoiding one risk creates new risks. For example, if a woman 
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with a genetic condition decides not to reproduce in order not to pass 
her “bad” genes, this will surely avoid the risk of passing them on, but 
could create a new risk such as emotional distress of not experiencing 
motherhood. In the context of regulation of genetic (and any other) risk, 
people and society engage in balancing loses and gains, and in deciding 
what is acceptable and what is unacceptable they take risks. In striving to 
normalize society by avoiding genetic risks, there is a danger of creating 
new risks, especially if the genetic results are taken at their face value5.
What lies behind this idea of genetic risk is, firstly that individual identity 
is reduced to the genome of the individual, and secondly that every 
individual seeks to have maximum information about his or her genetic 
make-up. The individual with a genetic disorder becomes a target 
audience, and is expected to make informed decisions and act as 
a responsible agent. It could also be the case that the individual does 
not want to know his genetic profile. Deftos warns that in contemporary 
society which puts so much value on the knowledge about our genetic 
make-up, individuals who do not want to have information about their 
genetic status could be regarded as “lacking moral competence” 
(Deftos, 1998). On the other hand, some authors, like Harris and Keywood 
argue that the right not to know does not even exist, that there is “no prima 
facie entitlement to be protected from true information about oneself” 
(Harris and Keywood, 2001). It follows that in the genetic era, Foucault’s 
model of disciplinary power is exercised through the notion of a “genetic 
risk” as a new mode of governing lives, whereby discipline is enforced 
through the internalization of surveillance6. As a consequence, governing 
through genetic risks increases personal responsibility and accountability 
for bad luck on the one hand and absolves formal institutions from 
their responsibility in causing diseases and disabilities on the other hand 
(Rouvroy, 2008). In this sense Foucault claims that “society is designing 
unbound and subtle power mechanisms and that power is relying on 
techniques rather than law, on normalizing rather than statues, on control 
rather than punishment, and it is implemented at levels and in forms that 
spill over the state and its apparatus” (Rouvroy, 2008, 84). 
5 Rouvroy argues that genetic truth discourses are often taken at face value, see Rouvroy, ’Human Genes and 
Neoliberal Governance: the Foucauldian Critique’, New York: Routledge 2008, 3.
6 Foucault uses the idea of Bentham’s model prison, Panopticon, as a metaphor to explain how the automatic 
functioning of power can be assured.  The idea is that the individual knows he or she has been watched all the time 
so even if the individual has not actually been watched, he or she could be watched and thus behaves as though 
someone has been monitoring. The individual internalizes the norms and behaves according to them: See generally 
Michele Foucault, ‘Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison’, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979.
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Ethical Dilemmas in Reproduction Counselling 
Arising from Developments in Genetic Knowledge 
and Practice
I believe that discussing ethical questions that arise from genetic 
reproduction counselling is first and foremost important because it involves 
a very intimate and central aspect of individual’s right. In addition, the 
accumulation of knowledge about human genetics and transformation 
of what is perceived normal has a consequence that, as Emily Jackson 
notes, genetic testing is being applied today to a wider population then 
it was the case before (Jackson, 2010, 427). Namely, we all have faulty 
genes and thus genetic testing could be “potentially relevant to all of us” 
(Jackson, 2010, 427). Moreover, Khoury, Linda McCabe and Edward R.B. 
McCabe point out that genetic screening will more frequently be used to 
determine individual susceptibility to common disorders. Consequently, 
this will result in widening the net of potential users of genetic screening 
and counselling. Due to the fact that many fertility clinics acknowledge 
the importance of their role in assessing any7 kind of genetic risk, more 
and more individuals will be under social pressure to engage in genetic 
screening and counselling8.  It could of course be argued that this only gives 
more options to potential users, who are then free to decide whether they 
want to engage in risk assessment procedures. However, the question is 
whether they are truly free in deciding whether to use or not these genetic 
technologies.  Furthermore, the knowledge of the human genome also 
has the capacity to shape identities, behaviours and expectations, and 
to alter the identity of the individual. 
7 I put an emphasis on the word “any” because it struck me that some fertility clinics do really engage in assessing any 
kind of genetic risks. Bearing in mind that we all have faulty genes, such a broad concept of genetic risk strengthens 
the argument that we are all potential users of genetic screening and genetic counselling services. Consequently, 
as Ettorre notes, “this changes our status of being healthy to being an asymptomatic ill person who self-enrols in 
continuous medical surveillance and monitoring process (Elizabeth Ettorre, ‘The Sociology of the New Genetics, 
Conceptualizing the Links Between Reproduction, Gender and Bodies in A. Petersen and R. Bunton, ‘Genetic 
Governance: Health, Risk and Ethics in the Biotech Era, Routledge 2005). See for example Fertility Clinic IVF 
Australia, http://ivf.com.au/fertility-specialists/ivf-australia-genetic-counsellors - accessed November 18, 2013.
8 It is also possible that fertility clinics will be exposed to an increased number of litigations for not warning their clients 
about genetic risks, especially with regard to donated gametes. 
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All those factors contribute to the importance of assessing the ethical 
implications9 that genetic reproduction counselling has in contemporary 
society. 
Lemke claims that “Liberal “eugenism”, despite its rejection of 
authoritarianism and its proclaimed respect for individual choice and 
human diversity, shares several features with “old” eugenism. Liberal 
eugenism efficiently “imposes” specific expectations of human normality 
and functioning that are unconsciously or consciously endorsed by 
individuals disciplined by the imperative of genetic self-knowledge, 
genetic risk avoidance etc.”(Lemke, 2002). Following Lemke’s argument, 
it could be said that the genetic knowledge we possess today, the 
burgeoning thrust of society to know even more about our genes and 
this new mode of governance – governance through knowledge, which 
I discussed in the previous chapter, opened up the scope for potential 
abuses given its effects on the ways in which we make decisions about our 
bodies and ourselves. In this section, I want to address the ethical concerns 
arising from those “expectations of human normality and functioning” 
that Lemke talks about. I wish to explore those issues in connection with 
genetic reproduction counselling10. 
In the sphere of reproduction, genetic testing followed by genetic 
counselling is currently being used to detect genetic disease either prior to 
or during pregnancy.  Thus, in my opinion, it is essential to consider what the 
aims of genetic counselling are and what significance is attributed to the 
individual voice in deciding whether to engage in genetic reproduction 
counselling, as well as during genetic counselling. 
9 It is worth noting that there is an important distinction in the approach to bioethics between postmodernism and 
mainstream bioethics. Namely advocates of postmodernism criticise the mainstream bioethics on relying too much 
on clear and distinct divisions such as right and wrong, health and disease, normal and abnormal as well as on 
individuality and rationality. Postmodernism on the other hand claims that there are multiple truths, none of which 
have the ultimate authority, and that there is no possibility of reaching a definite solution. Further discussion on 
this issue is beyond the scope of this paper but for deeper insight into the differences between mainstream and 
postmodern bioethics see Margit Shildrick, ‘Beyond the Body of Bioethics: Challenging the Conventions’ in Margit 
Shildrick and Roxanne Mykitiuk, ‘Ethics of the Body Postconventional Challenges’, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2005.
10 It should be noted that the fears that genetic information could be misused is present to a large extent in relation to 
health insurance and employment. Namely, based on the genetic information, individuals deemed to have genetic 
diseases could be denied access to employment and insurance. However, those issues extend beyond this paper 
and I shall not deal with them in the following sections. See for example A. Rouvroy, ‘Human Genes and Neoliberal 
Governance: A Foucauldian Critique’, New York: Routledge, 2008, Chapter 2.
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Fertility clinics around the world offer genetic counselling services to those 
who are deemed to be at risk of reproducing genetically “abnormal”11 
children. They make promises of bringing healthy beautiful babies into this 
world12. I wonder what kind of messages those promises send.  I surely do 
not assert that having a healthy baby is a bad thing but I do believe that 
such messages and invitations to undergo genetic screening do increase 
the pressure on those with genetic conditions either to undergo genetic 
screening or not to have children. Clark for example claims that even “an 
offer of prenatal diagnosis implies a recommendation to accept the offer” 
(Clark, 1991).  On the other hand, Jackson claims that “it is not obvious that 
the existence of external influences necessarily undermines the legitimacy 
of a particular choice” (Jackson, 2001). I do agree that external influence 
does not undermine the legitimacy of decision making per se. However, 
since in practice it is hard to distinguish when the external influence 
did diminish the legitimacy of an individual’s decision, I believe that 
counsellors should strive to be ethically neutral in order not to jeopardize 
the counselees’ freedom of choice. We should surely not underestimate 
the capacity of social norms to govern our behaviour. It is not uncommon 
that genetic teams in infertility clinics emphasize the importance that 
those individuals who are aware of the presence of certain family health 
conditions undergo genetic testing and act according to the results of 
those tests. Petersen argues that individuals are not only expected to 
want to use genetic reproduction technologies in order to make socially 
responsible decisions, but that prenatal genetic technologies are even 
seen as “driven by consumer demand” (Petersen, 2003). Thus individuals 
designated as being at risk are expected to behave as responsible agents 
and engage in the offered genetic screening services. This will inevitably 
result in changing individual’s self-perception and put pressure on women 
with genetic conditions not to have offspring. Ettorre notes that genetic 
counselling has a similar function as psychoanalysis in that “it makes visible 
genetic elements of an individual and makes one’s biological destiny 
evident.” In making those genetic elements visible, individuals perceived 
as being at risk are expected to exert their responsibility and to take steps 
in order to mitigate and minimise genetic risks (Ettore, 2005). If they do 
not act according to those expectations, it is very likely that they will be 
11 When referring to abnormal, I mean that which is considered different from what is usually founded in communal 
beliefs and is not normal according to today’s society standards.
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deemed irresponsible members of society13. 
Once engaged in the genetic counselling session, it is undisputable that 
counselees should be provided with the information about genetic risks. 
Nonetheless, the way in which such information is presented to those 
being counselled risks, as Nagl points out, that development in genetic 
technology could have the implication of “silencing of the patient’s 
voice in medical discourse” (Nagl, 2005). The proclaimed principle in 
genetic reproduction counselling is the principle of non-directiveness14. 
It is broadly accepted that genetic counselling should be non-directive 
and guarantee that the informed decisions of those being counselled are 
made on a voluntary basis. Yet, I believe that the capacity of genetic 
information to regulate our behaviour in an informal way through social 
pressure questions the proclaimed freedom of choice. 
In contemporary society, the proximity to the standards of normality and 
perfection became an important aspect of social acceptance, and in my 
belief, this is where the most obvious link between the practices of eugenics 
and medical genetics today can be recognised. A lot of emphasis is put 
on the “progress” and “normalization” of the individual body, resulting in 
the transformation and categorization of society according to available 
knowledge about human genetics15. Fraser’s argument that the Nazi 
regime and its medical professionals perceived eugenic practices, which 
brought enormous suffering and death, not as self-professed barbarism 
but as an advancement of civilization and “progress”, supports my claim 
about the continuity of the two ideologies. Clearly, the greater knowledge 
about human genetics we possess nowadays has opened the potential 
not only for prejudices and discriminatory practices of those with sub-
optimal genetic material, but has also influenced the ways in which we 
are expected to relate to our bodies and society. Thus, the proclaimed 
13 Abby Lippman, for example, claims that in North America it is generally assumed that women are obliged to 
produce a healthy child, which makes it hard for women who are told to be at risk “to refuse measures that are 
advertised to be risk-reducing”. See A. Lippman, ‘Prenatal Genetic Testing and Screening: Constructing Needs and 
Reinforcing Inequities’, American Journal of Law and Medicine, Vol. 17  NOS.1&2, 1991.
14 For example, the Ethical Guidelines of Australian Health Ethics Committee, which identify ethical principles that must 
inform the conduct of clinicians and researches and the procedures in the use of assisted reproductive technologies, 
inter alia proscribe that clinics should provide and discuss information in a way that is appropriate to, and sufficient 
for informed decision making, and more importantly that the information should be given without any unnecessary 
inducement. See http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/guidelines/publications/subject/Genetics%20and%20Gene%20
Technology, accessed 20 November 2013
15 Foucault noted that eugenics was integral to the effort to transform life. See M. Foucault, ‘The History of Sexuality, 
Volume One: An Introduction’, Harmonsdworf: Penguin, 1981.
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principle of non-directiveness and the freedom of choice do not mean 
absence of power. On the contrary, power has just changed its shape 
and functions in a different way, through disciplinary practices which 
require us to meet standards imposed on us by society and then being 
internalized.
I do not deny that we are necessarily connected and dependent on other 
people and community, but as Isabel Karpin notes “the only question is 
where power resides in these interconnected selves” (Karpin, 2010, 151), 
and what does power aim to achieve. In emphasizing the importance 
of the informed choice and proclaiming non-directiveness as its main 
principal, genetic counselling seeks to protect itself from being accused of 
having eugenic motivations. However, it seems that by declaring the non-
directive model of genetic counselling as a prevailing model, our society 
only appears to be liberal in dealing with issues of reproduction. Despite 
such a proclamation, it can be argued that our society is repressive and 
ascribes more importance to the welfare and the “normalization” and 
stabilization of society then to the individual needs, rights and values. 
For instance, it appears to me that in genetic reproduction counselling, 
fertility clinics are more in favour of eliminating any genetic disorder and 
achieving the ultimate goal of “normalizing” society then providing help 
and support to the individual.
Patterson and Satz note that the overriding assumption is that being born 
with a disabling genetic condition is a bad thing and that the task of 
genetic counselling is to give information to those deemed to be at risk 
and encourage them to take steps that would minimize or remove those 
risks. If this is truly the overriding assumption of our society, it is hard to 
imagine that counsellors could detach themselves from such beliefs and 
truly act according to allegedly embraced principle of non-directivenes. 
Patterson and Satz give an example of the couple with Achonodroplasia 
who did not perceive their “condition” as negative and wanted to have a 
child with Achonodroplasia. The case depicts how hard it is for counsellors 
to step aside and start thinking in a way that is different from their usual 
way of thinking, and how the model of non-directiveness in actually 
problematic in practice. Counsellors regularly present only negative 
images of disability in initial prenatal counselling sessions, which present a 
“constructed reality grounded in the scientific and medical definition of 
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a given genetic condition” (Patterson and Satz, 2005). Consequently, this 
necessarily significantly influences the decision of counselees. Moreover, 
Patterson and Satz observe that during their training, counsellors rarely 
have the opportunity to experience disability from different perspectives 
(Patterson and Satz). Thus they hold on to their beliefs which mirror the 
prevailing beliefs of society, according to which a disabling genetic 
condition is necessarily a bad thing. Wendell suggests that we should 
value disabilities as differences, which would enable people to see that 
not every disability is necessarily a bad thing (Wendell, 1996, 84). However, 
Gilligan warns that since our society is fixated at normality, difference easily 
becomes deviance, which is often perceived as a sin (Gilligan, 1982). This 
indicates that even though evaluating disabilities as differences is more 
neutral, the reluctance of our society to appreciate differences and its 
obsession with normality and perfection does not create an environment 
in which choices about reproduction are ultimately one’s own choices.  
If the fundamental bias of the counsellors is against abnormality, it means 
that they strive to achieve “normality”. Jackson argues that women 
whose fertility is perceived to be a social problem often receive strong 
messages from the negative attitudes of health professionals not to 
reproduce. It could be argued that by sending messages to people with 
genetic disabilities not to reproduce, society is aiming to reduce social 
problems by reducing the number of people with disabilities. Even though 
decisions were meant to be made on an informed and voluntary basis, 
the emerging genetic knowledge has the effect of putting the individual 
under pressure to make socially desirable decisions, and, as Lemke states, 
to produce “normal” children.  
I am not suggesting that the countries which use genetic screening today 
are like Nazi Germany, but there are some points of continuity in the ideas 
of advancement, improvement of nature and of science as a way to a 
better future. The conditions in which reproduction decisions are made 
are capable of creating an environment in which individual autonomy 
and choice are sacrificed for the communal good. Petersen notes that 
“with increased surveillance and intervention, the notion that genetic 
counsellors can, and should be value-free and non-directive will be more 
and more difficult to sustain” (Petersen, 2007). I wonder how explicitly 
counselees are informed about positive experiences of the people who 
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live with disabilities. In a society such as ours, where being born with a 
disability is seen as a tragedy, those positive experiences are easily 
overlooked. Thus, I believe that only by striving to understand and respect 
perspectives of people with genetic conditions and disabilities would free 
our society from the quest of “normalization” and perfection of human 
body and we could then say that the principle of non-directiveness is 
truly embodied in the genetic counselling practices. Otherwise, as the 
law was used to “protect” society during Nazism from those deemed 
“unfit”, so today it could be said that the increased genetic knowledge 
requires individuals to sacrifice their beliefs, convictions and wishes for the 
collective good. If not on a conscious level, then surely at the level of the 
subconscious. 
I believe that acting upon the unfavourable opinion of someone, rather 
than using a straight-forward prohibition, is potentially more dangerous 
from traditional command-and-control projection of power. It does not 
only bring uncertainty but also creates the notion of the genetic risks 
that are not beyond the control of the individual (Rouvroy, 2008, 67). I 
agree with Douglas who notes that “the construction of risk individuals, 
risk couples, risk pregnancies etc. makes it easier to moralize on deviant 
behaviour and to assign guilt and responsibility”. This corresponds to the 
idea that Koch and Svendsen have put forward (Koch and Svendsen, 
2005). They assert that the wish for the proper use of genetic knowledge 
has created a notion of ethical responsibility which individuals exert 
towards themselves and their relatives. However, I disagree with their 
claim that precisely genetic information passed to counselees makes 
them autonomous individuals who voluntarily make responsible choices 
about their health and the health of their relatives16. Biomedicine is 
powerful in creating social identities and Shildrick rightly notes that health 
care today “is as much about control, containment, and normalization as 
it is about treatment” (Shildrick, 2005, 17). The actions of the designated 
individual are expected to conform to the expectations of society which 
attaches great importance to the normalization of the human body. 
Rouvroy argues that “when the social or the “average man” becomes 
the standard against which normality and deviations are articulated, 
the “normal” is increasingly defined by reference to standards external 
16 Koch and Svendsen draw their conclusion from observing the practice of cancer genetic counselling. Thus, 
their observations necessarily have limited application to reproduction genetic counselling, where the fears of 
associating such practices are far greater.
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to the individual” (Rouvroy, 2008, 103). It seems that despite not having 
laws proscribing sterilization and special courts that would apply them, 
society is still capable of preventing those who are “unfit” from continuing 
its kind. And again, medical science is taking part in the construction 
and maintenance of this taxonomy (Fraser, 1989, 30) creating classes 
of “us” and “them”. Rouvroy claims that despite the claim that genetic 
counselling is left to individual choices, those choices become the precise 
medium through which a new form of governance is exercised, taking 
citizens’ bodies as both vectors and targets of normalization (Rouvroy, 
2008, 82). Instead of using prohibition, we use unofficial channels to 
regulate, and society sends strong messages that there are those who are 
“normal” according to its standards and “abnormal”, and that we should 
do whatever is possible to prevent spreading the genes of those deemed 
to be “abnormal” or at least help them mitigate the abnormalities. 
The nature of the counsellors’ advices is inevitably value-laden but what 
is needed in my opinion is the following: firstly the acknowledgement 
that many factors shape the representation and perception of genetic 
information, and secondly critical questioning of the basis on which their 
beliefs are made. Society should foster an environment in which exercise 
of reproductive choice is practically possible and effective, not just illusory 
and theoretical. As Shildrick argues, “the real test of bioethics is whether it 
is able to operate adequately in practice” (Shildrick, 2005). Thus genetic 
counsellors should be appropriately trained how to communicate genetic 
information, and should be given the opportunity to listen to the views 
of people living with what most counsellors would call abnormalities. 
This would give them another perspective and understanding of the 
needs of those to whom they offer their services, and would result in 
responding to counselees with greater respect. I agree with Wendell’s 
viewpoint according to which “not every disability is a tragic loss and that 
not everyone with the disability wants to be cured” (Wendell, 1996, 88). 
Besides, implementing social measures that would improve care of those 
with disabilities, instead of offering genetic screening programmes and 
solutions, seems to me as a more humane approach.
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Conclusion
 The aim of both eugenics and genetics is to control and regulate the 
behaviour of the population either through formal channels e.g. law, 
or informal, i.e. encouraging designated persons to self-discipline and 
behave in the way society expects them to. The aim of this paper was 
to depict how genetic knowledge as a disciplinary device, challenges 
the population to be healthy and, to show its capacity to control and 
influence self-perception. Such control does not conform to our ideas 
about democracy and equality, and we must ensure that our rights to 
make final decisions on such matters as reproduction are respected. If 
humanity is not ready to respect those rights, we are surely not ready for 
the ever increasing genetic knowledge we are coming to possess. If we 
are to learn from past mistakes, we should be cautious in the way genetic 
reproduction technologies are deployed. We should also be aware and 
openly discuss their potential ramifications, and the ways they influence 
choices about our bodies. In order not to generate stigmatization and 
discrimination based on genetic makeup of the individual, open debate, 
fostering tolerance and an honest dialogue between scientists, counsellors, 
practitioners, counselees and the public about ethical questions arising 
from the use of the genetic information is highly needed17. Commitment 
to the principle of non-directiveness and ensuring that decisions about 
our bodies are made on a voluntary basis is of the utmost importance. In 
addition, raising public awareness and awareness of counsellors that their 
decisions are often value-laden is crucial in ensuring this goal. Insights from 
people with genetic conditions or disabilities could be of a great value in 
raising such awareness and it would take us closer to the goal we should 
be striving to achieve. Namely that decisions we make about our bodies 
are not imposed on us as duties we have to bare but are reflections of our 
own value systems and choices. 
17 An idea of using theatre to encourage engagement and discussion of broader public on ethical and other 
implications of genetic testing applied in Canada in 2005 seems like a good example of how the goals of 
tolerance and mutual understanding can be fostered. For more details on Canadian theatre, see Isabel Karpin, 
‘Taking care of the ‘health’ of preconceived human embryos or constructing legal harms’ in Isabel Karpin ‘ The 
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